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Alessandro Guetta (posté le 20/12/1999) INALCO
RELIGIOUS LIFE AND JEWISH ERUDITION IN PISA: YECHIEL NISSIM DA PISA AND THE CRISIS OF
ARISTOTELISM We know a good deal about the Da
Pisa family, as well as about the financial and intellectual activities of
its members, thanks to the research of David Kaufmann, Umberto Cassuto and
Michele Luzzati.[1]
By now we know that the Da Pisa family included lenders of great importance
even on a national scale, as well as rabbinical authorities who were
extremely productive in the field of juridical decisions, thought (both
cabalist and philosophic) and even of poetry. For at least three generations,
from the last decades of the fifteenth century to half way through the
following, the Da Pisas were one of the main reference points of the entire
Italian Jewish community. Much attention has been given
recently to the figure of Yechiel (Vitale) Nissim Da Pisa (1493? - before
1572), author of the important philosophical text Minchath Kenaoth (The gift of zeal), dated 1539,[2] and
of two other shorter works, the Discourse
on the Ten Sefiroth (Heb.), previous to the Minchath, and the Discourse
on the Righteous Man and the Purpose of the World (Heb.), dated 1559,[3] as
well as of a juridical text on loans with interest, the Discourse on Eternal Life (Heb.).[4]
In Rabbis and Jewish Communities in
Renaissance Italy, Roberto Bonfil dedicated several very dense pages to
this scholar, reading his work in the context of the crisis of Medieval
rationalism, a crisis which interested both Christians and Jews of the time.[5] The
present study intends to develop a few parts of Bonfil's interpretation,
following his general orientation. We will then try to sketch the
intellectual portrait of Yechiel, both in reference to Jewish tradition and
to the Italian culture of his time. All of Yechiel's works circulated
as manuscripts, even though some of them (such as the Discourse on Eternal Life) were probably meant to be published.[6] In
its scope as in its ambition, the Minchath
Kenaoth distinguishes itself from the others. It is a punctual
confutation of the Iggereth
Hithnatzeluth (Letter of justification) written by the provençal
philosopher and moralist Yeda‘yah Bedersi (known as "ha-Penini,"
1270-1340) in reaction to Shelomo ben Addereth's decision to prohibit the
study of the natural sciences and philosophy before the age of twenty-five.[7] Bedersi's Letter is a brief, but extremely clear, list of the advantages
that religion draws from the study of philosophy; Yechiel examines it in
detail and replies to all of Bedersi's arguments, furthering the discourse
remarkably. The result is an actual treatise, in which the main problems of
the philosophical tradition are analyzed according to the classical structure
of the Tomistic quaestio: first the
adversary's opinion is presented, along with a detailed analysis of the
argument according to the main philosophers, and then the author describes
his own position, which he founds on what he considers to be the authentic
Jewish tradition. It goes without saying that by
philosophy, or free rational research, Yechiel means Aristotelism, as it
developed from Aristotle, through his Greek, Arab and Jewish commentators, up
until the more recent discussions of the Italian "university
philosophy." The work's objective is clearly presented from the very
introduction, which is written in a precious rhymed prose: it opposes the
position of those who want to show
the great advantages to be gained from the study and knowledge of that
science called philosophy, as if without it the sacred Torah did not have the right to be placed in the highest ranks
and as if its beliefs [...] did not make any sense without her: in short, the
maid who passes as a lady [...] But we have the obligation to destroy and
shatter these confused opinions and bad beliefs: this is what ruins our
people and corrupts our patrimony [...]. The Torah deserves the primogeniture, it is the light of all other
sciences.[8] Further on, Yechiel nuances and
clarifies his idea: My
objections do not regard the intensive study of philosophy as such, because
science qua science makes possible
the knowledge of the causes or the natural hierarchy of things, and thus can
be pursued with profit; as long as it helps to know the reality of the
entities, as these were created, and as to their use, but not when it claims
to be the main moment and the evaluating criterion of the Torah.[9] The book's long introduction
continues, developing these fundamental points: 1) the centrality of the Torah as a source of knowledge; 2) the refutation of allegory as a
means by which to explain the Bible. According to the allegorists: in
the Torah there would not be
teachings relative to what is permitted and what is prohibited, to the guilty
and the innocent, to the sacrifices and the offerings; instead, it would
overflow with notions of incommensurable value, like the primary material called hylé that is ready to assume any form, towards which it is
attracted like a man to a young woman, or the rotation of the spheres, etc.[10]; 3) the self-sufficiency of the Torah, if accompanied by its esoteric
explanations: Every
thing is included in brief mentions in its letters, in its vocalization and
cantillation signs, in the closed passages and in the open ones, in the marks
to be added over some of the letters, just as it was delivered to the
greatest of the shepherds from the mouth of the Lord [...] Such is the qabbalah, orally transmitted unto us.[11] All this is accompanied by an
affirmation of proud particularism ("Why turn to others? [...] Why
return to Egypt in search of help? Why embrace a foreign breast?"[12]) in
which argumentation is replaced by a peremptory affirmation, and the
concatenation of rational discourse by the rhetoric of suggestion. 1.
The components of Yechiel's thought According to Yechiel, the
alternative way to philosophy develops through these successive phases: 1) the anti-intellectualism of
Yehudah ha-Lewy (1075-1141), author of the book of Kuzari (The king of the Cazari), considered the champion of the
traditional attitude vis-à-vis the rational[13]; 2) the interpretative attitude, it
too profoundly anti-intellectualistic, of Mosheh ben Nachman (acrostic
RaMBaN, 1194-1270); 3) the vision of the sefiroth, according to the Italian
cabalist tradition. 1) The Spanish scholar and poet is
cited at length by Yechiel, who quotes in
extenso his strong declarations against the philosophical notion of
prophecy as the highest level in the scale of intellection: one does not
prophesy, according Yehuda ha-Lewy, after the union of the potential
intellect with the agent intellect, but thanks to the constant application of
the Torah's commandments. We will
consider this argument in detail later on. Yechiel also appropriates
ha-Lewy's declarations of the uniqueness of the Jewish people, object of a
special divine love and in which alone the authentic prophecy could be
realized. Yechiel is not the only Jewish intellectual in Italy to turn to
Yehuda ha-Lewy as an alternative to Aristotelian-Maimonidean rationalism.
During this period, the Kuzari
reached the great level of dignity of Maimonides' Guide for the perplexed.[14]
At the end of the previous century, with the typical Italian Jewish respect
for Maimonides, the cabalist Elia di Genazzano had already affirmed that he
did not want to insist in his critique of the Spanish philosopher, because
there already existed a book which could function as a perfect counter-altar
to the Guide: the Kuzari, "which does not have
equals in its accordance with truth and its harmony with the qabbalah," a book worthy of being
the object of constant attention "of the eyes and of the heart."[15] 2) Yechiel claims to have founded
his ideas entirely on Nachmanides,[16]
whom he cites in support of the fundamental idea that the Torah is the origin of all the other
sciences, as well as of several interpretations, both religious -- the
question of individual providence -- and sometimes esoteric -- the
transmigration of souls.[17]
One needs to remember that Moshe ben Nachman is an uncompromising upholder of
the tradition, which he naturally sees going back to Moses -- and therefore
to the divine revelation -- and which he considers in antithesis to the
results of autonomous reflection: "What I write on the secrets of the Torah
-- so does he conclude his dense introduction to the commentary on the
Pentateuch -- certainly does not result from individual reasoning and
understanding, but it was transmitted to me by a master; so does the student
who is taught become a person who understands." Close to Nachmanides' sensibility
is also the idea of God's absolute freedom in regards to the world; his action
is not limited by the separate intellects, and even less by the laws of
nature.[18]
Omniscience corresponds to absolute freedom. And therefore the total
opposition to the provençal philosopher Gersonides (1288-1344) is more than
logical, for the latter denied to God the knowledge of man's single and
freely performed acts. The freedom of man -- which, as we will see, is
extremely vast, although not absolute -- is not for Yechiel in contradiction
with divine knowledge, to which are then linked providence and justice.[19] 3) Thanks to the studies of Moshe
Idel, we can distinguish a cabalist tradition specific to Italian Jews. This
tradition, which refers back to Menachem Recanati (XIII-XIVth centuries) and
was developed by Yochanan Alemanno, is characterized by a strong
philosophical bent, as well as by its relative degree of freedom from the
influence of the Zohar's mythical
thought, typical instead of the Spanish qabbalah.[20] One
of the most remarkable points of divergence concerned the nature of the sefiroth. The problem, whose delicacy
and importance become clear when one considers the question of the attributes
in Spinoza's Ethics, regards the
question of whether or not the sefiroth
belong to the divine substance (‘atzmuth).
Recanati, the author of an important esoteric commentary on the Torah, defines the sefiroth as instruments -- or
receptacles -- (kelim) of the
divine activity ("as instruments in the hands of an artisan [...] yet
tightly united among themselves and with a single spirit for all")[21] --
and as such knowable -- thereby distinguishing them from the substance of God
(the ein sof) which remains
unknowable. In his commentary on the Song
of Songs, Alemanno returns to this distinction and illustrates it through
the similitude of soul and body -- a comparison which can give an idea both
of the relationship between invisible cause and visible effects, and of the
relationship between the unity of God and the multiplicity of forces ruling
the world.[22]
Yechiel's uncle, Yitzchaq of Pisa, who certainly knew Alemanno, his
contemporary and long-time guest of the Da Pisas, is the protagonist of an
epistolary exchange with the rabbi of Spanish origin Yitzchaq mar Chayyim;
this correspondence reveals a position different from Alemanno's, in that the sefiroth are not considered solely as
instrumental, but also -- at least
for the first two, or three -- as essential.[23] We will not delve into a
discussion of these difficult, though fundamental, classifications. Naturally
one must wonder about the degree of "philosophical" awareness with
which these minute distinctions were made. We take it for granted that the
scholars in question did not limit themselves to a servile repetition of
themes whose depth they ignored. Obviously, pedagogical traditions played an
important -- albeit not exclusive -- role in determining their different
stances; nevertheless, even beyond what may appear to be mere formulas (the
statute of the sefiroth; the
relationship between the sefiroth ein
sof and keter; the
classification of the sefiroth in
subcategories), the main question is whether these authors were aware of the
fact that they were treating issues of great importance, such as the
relationship between God and the world, between the mystery and the knowable,
the ineffable and the sayable. In any case, after having
remembered that Yechiel seems to uphold his uncle Yitzchaq's theory,[24] it
is important to signal the fact that this debate of ideas combines
philosophy's conceptual terminology with the qabbalah's: the sefiroth
are defined as "attributes", the
Ein sof is the "primary cause." In Yechiel, critic of
philosophy, the relationship between God and the world -- a relationship of
entirely cabalist inspiration -- is made to overlap with Aristotelian physics
and metaphysics: God
transmits his spiritual energy (shefa‘)
and strength to his attributes, without undergoing any changes; from there,
this transmission of energy descends to the world of the intellects, and
thereafter to the spheres, and finally to the sublunar world.[25] This is a real overlay, in which,
according to the cabalist, esoteric doctrine may complete, rather than
refute, the philosophical: the first begins where the second leaves off.
Alemanno had been clear on the subject: "The wise of Israel speak of a
world which is not that of the philosophers: the world of the sefiroth is superior to that of the
corruptible entities, as well as to the world of circular movements and that
of the angels."[26] 2.
Qabbalah and philosophy Yitzchaq mar Chayyim had already
warned his correspondent in regards to the relationship between tradition and
autonomous reflection, inviting him to choose the first as his reference
point, that is to adapt philosophy to the qabbalah,
and not the contrary. "Rational research in this field is prohibited to
us," Yitzchaq mar Chayyim contends elsewhere; "instead, it is to
the prophetic qabbalah that we must
turn, because it is superior to reason."[27] This monitory of a Spanish teacher
confirms a contrario the Italian qabbalah's philosophical tendency, of
which Yechiel is a typical representative. Yechiel's philosophical forma mentis is for the rest confirmed
by the scholastic course of his juridical argument. In the Discourse on Eternal Life, his brief
text on loans with interest, declaredly written as a juridical synthesis and
reference book for the numerous Jews who supported themselves on financial
activities, Yechiel (a) pronounces the most general principles on which the
argumentative construction is founded; (b) elaborates a syllogism from which
to deduce the general conclusion; (c) announces the necessity of studying
each particular case; and (d) finally proceeds to the definitions, which
delimit the problems to be discussed and facilitate their solution.[28] Presented only to be confuted, the
abundance and precision of the philosophical arguments in the Minchath Kenaoth clearly illustrate
Yechiel's deep understanding of the discipline. His culture was naturally
based on the Arab-Jewish Aristotelian tradition: other than the Zohar, Yechiel had personally copied Averroé's
commentary on books III and IV of Aristotle's Physics[29];
thanks to his knowledge of Latin, he was also acquainted with the most
recently published works in Italy. A precious source for him are the
extensive syntheses of his contemporary Agostino Nifo, to whom Yechiel refers
many times in his thorough analyses of particular questions.[30] Several philosophical expositions,
on the intellect for example, are wide-reaching and exemplary in terms of
their order and clarity; they can sound even more convincing than their
propositive part, as this does not always present a unified and coherent
thought. Roberto Bonfil has therefore argued that Yechiel finds himself at
the turning point between two cultural eras and that he masters the discourse
of the older era, which he refuses, better than that of the new, which isn't
well defined yet. This statement, important from the point of view of
historical perspective, should perhaps be nuanced in regards to Yechiel's
specific competence not only in rabbinical tradition, but also in the qabbalah itself. The Pisan scholar
masters basic texts like the Zohar,
just as he also establishes a precise position for himself within cabalist
thought -- a position which reveals both technical knowledge and deliberate
intellectual choices.[31] Naturally the qabbalah is not simply a philosophy, or at least not in the
Aristotelian sense. Independently from the issue of its origins (traditional
or rational), the qabbalah
represents an intuitive attitude which would function as an alternative (or
complement, as we have seen) to the Aristotelian discursive reason. The
relationship between unity and plurality as the cabalists intend it (as do
also, ultimately, the Neoplatonists) cannot be analyzed with Aristotelian
conceptual instruments. When Yechiel refrains from analyzing these subjects
in further depth,[32]
it is not because of any superficiality or incompetence on his part; rather,
he is aware of the fact that they can only be treated in allusive and
intuitive terms, with a metaphoric or even mythical lexicon: The
question of the attributes is one of the most profound of all theology (chokhmah elohith, divine science).
[...] All actions which manifest themselves in reality are potentially qualities (middoth) through which God acts, as instruments in the hands of
an artisan; however, they are not separated from God, rather they are united
in Him in a total unity that words are
not capable of describing.[33] Yechiel's adhesion to the
philosophical dimension, and at the same time the distance that he keeps from
it, are visible in his definition of the stars' and celestial spheres'
constitution. They are of "sefirothic material": here the
ontological character of the substance serves to define an element, be this
celestial or Aristotle's "fifth element." Beyond this coincidence
in terminology, however, the difference between the Aristotelians' position
and Yechiel's is evident from the very beginning. Maimonides, who in this
regard referred back to Aristotle, had defined the fifth element negatively
(it is neither light nor heavy, etc.), for the obvious reason that we do not
have any direct experience of it.[34]
Where the philosopher had prudently stopped because of a lack of proof,
Yechiel advances without any scruples. The combination of his
anti-intellectualistic and intuitivistic attitudes culminates in a need for
positive contents which the schools' philosophy could not provide. This is
perhaps the most historically significant aspect of Yechiel's work, which we will
discuss in further detail later on. 3. Yechiel,
Renaissance man. Once
again, it is to Idel's research that we owe the particular attention given to
the magic -- and Neoplatonic -- character of a certain qabbalah. Of course this had been a well known fact for a while,
in part thanks to the Christian qabbalah
and its magic-alchemic elements. However, their importance had been forgotten
in the shadow of the great figure of Gershom Scholem, who, in his
reconstruction of the historical development of Jewish esotericism, had not
highlighted these aspects. The magic aspect is emphasized by
Idel, in the same studies mentioned above, in regards to Yochanan Alemanno
and Yitzchaq of Pisa. This step marked considerable progress in linking
Jewish historiography -- for a long time the prisoner of a reductive
rationalism -- and European historiography, which instead had learned to see
magic as an important step in the development of a "modern"
consciousness. To a certain extent Yechiel shares this trust in magic: clearly
a Renaissance man in his behavior, he was also one in his mental attitudes. After having reached the highest
level of spirituality, man can attach his soul to the superior worlds and
cause divine energies to descend onto the world, by means of his moral
virtues and accomplishment of the precepts. Thanks to this union, in a way he
too becomes divine and is thus able to intervene in the normal course of
nature, which, as we have seen, is totally dependent on divine will: When
man ascends from one level to another thanks to those steps which are
represented by the virtues which the Torah
indicates and which our teachers call pietas
[hassiduth], and after the
accomplishment of the Torah in its
general rules as well as in its details, his soul strongly adheres to and
unites itself with the superior worlds, attracting and propagating the divine
presence [shekhinah]; he will
therefore provide the people with true knowledge, and will conduct them along
the right way. That man will then be able to accomplish prodigies and
miracles, and change the course of nature.[35] At
this level he will become entirely spiritual and divine, and while remaining
in this world he will belong to the superior worlds, and these will obey him
as it happened with the prophets. Thus even the teachers of Israel, when the
prophecy was interrupted, by virtue of their absolute adhesion [devekuth] to God caused the dead to
resurrect and the living suddenly to die. They overturned the order and
nature of the world, because they adhered to blessed God, and he
"fulfills the desires of those who fear him." (Psalms, CXLV, 19).[36] All the different components of
these propositions are already in Alemanno, and many of them can be found in
Florentine Neoplatonism. Alemanno speaks explicitly of the descent of
spiritual energies on the world thanks to the intervention of that man who is
capable of receiving and directing the divine emanations and their powers.[37] And
if Pico della Mirandola describes man as "et caelestium et terrestrium
vinculum et nodus si in se ipso pacem et foedera sancit,"[38]
Yechiel recalls the Zohar's image
of the tabernacle and the terrestrial Temple (both the historical and the
future) as places in which the superior and inferior worlds have been, and
will be, strongly linked, thereby fulfilling the will of God.[39] One
should note, however, that despite these important mentions, in Yechiel's
writing magic does not have the weight that instead it seems to possess in
Alemanno's. Yechiel does not insist on the subject, and more importantly he
completely ignores all descriptions of magical practices, on which Alemanno,
instead, dwells at length (for example, on how to prepare to receive the
divine energy through the reading of the Torah,
which is the equivalent of reading the names of God)[40];
in the Minchath Kenaoth, there is a
single and rapid mention of the mystical properties of the letters and of the
vocalization and cantillation signs.[41] Yechiel is interested, on the one
hand, in establishing the privileged role of man within the universe, and of
the Jewish people in their relationship to God in particular, and on the
other in showing the inadequacy of conceptual instruments to fulfill this
destiny. He therefore limits the importance of magic, inserting it within the
traditional and anti-intellectualistic framework that we have already
described. As he exalts man's calling, Yechiel appears to emphasize the
descent of divine energies onto the world by virtue of the just man's work,
while he neglects the Zoharic concept of harmony between the sefiroth themselves as a consequence
of human action. The affirmation of the absolute freedom of God is combined
with the anthropocentric vision of the world created for the good and
perfection of man.[42] Moreover, to this problem Yechiel dedicated
his whole Discourse on the Righteous
Man and the Purpose of the World, a short treatise written in answer to
the letter of a certain Ya‘aqov from Modena which contained the following
questions: is man more important than the angels? was the world created for
man? Yechiel correctly links the two questions and, as already in the Minchath Kenaoth, he reviews the
philosophical doctrines on the subject, to which he then opposes others drawn
from the rabbinical-cabalist tradition. In order to understand fully
Yechiel's answers, it is necessary to remember that, according to Maimonides,
in this regard a faithful follower of Aristotle, man cannot be seen as the
object of creation, because every entity was created for the good of that
same entity, and not for any other. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy of
purity of beings, within which man occupies an inferior position than the
separate and celestial intellects (identified with the angels).[43] Yechiel's answer is the opposite
of Maimonides': man is a microcosm, a model of all worlds. When he is just,
he is superior to the angels; his soul originates on the throne of God's
glory, to which it returns when it separates from the body, even before
death. It is the Torah, which
preceded the existence of the world, which allows corruptible man to ascend
to the superior worlds and to unite himself with God, leaving the angels
beneath him.[44]
It seems almost superfluous to remark how close this idea is to Renaissance
Neoplatonism, of which it represents the Jewish version.[45] 4. The uniqueness of Israel Speaking of Yechiel Nissim from
Pisa, Bonfil underlines how his opposition to scholastic thought also implies
the revaluation of the idea of the uniqueness
of the Jew -- as an individual and as a people -- which this same thought had
somewhat disregarded.[46]
And in fact we have seen not only how the Torah
is an instrument of elevation, but also which is the privileged position of
the Jewish people among men: it is like the heart among the members of the
body.[47] Yechiel underlines the uniqueness
of Israel time and again. This idea is highlighted especially in the
"classical" argument, bent on proving the insufficiency of
philosophy in comparison with authentic prophecy: indeed, if prophecy really
were a union, favored by the imaginative faculty, of the potential intellect
with the agent intellect, as Avicenna and Maimonides contended, it is not
clear why the philosophers were not prophets, and why among the latter only
the Jews prophesied in truth and at length. In reality, it is the performance
of the mitzwoth and the knowledge
of the Torah's secrets -- both
reserved to Israel -- that allow one to acquire prophetic abilities.[48] Regarding divine providence,
Yechiel establishes a hierarchy of entities which views animals as the object
of divine providence qua species,
humans qua individuals and the Jews
qua individuals who receive a
particular attention in that their
form is particular and separated from the rest of the human kind, and it is
therefore right that providence be more individualized in their regard.
Indeed, the more a man is close to God -- thanks to his accomplishment of the
precepts -- the more He who provides is close to he who enjoys this
providence, and never does He abandon him with his gaze.[49] It is interesting to note here
that Yechiel alters Maimonides' argument, whose influence he explicitly
acknowledges, right at the end. According to the Spanish philosopher, divine
providence applies to animals as species and to men as individuals. The latter
receive a particular attention from God in proportion to their degree of
perfection, which is mainly of an intellectual order and which, in the Guide, does not seem to refer in any
way to the Jews.[50]
Yechiel replaces this hierarchy of intelligence with an essentialist
hierarchy of form and of the accomplishment of the precepts, it too an
essentialist act in that, by virtue of their own nature, the precepts are
close to God. Furthermore, the Pisan rabbi's
argument differs from the beliefs of many of his Jewish contemporaries. As
humanists, they argued for the superiority of Israel on the basis of the
antiquity of their laws, a claim which was also informed by a cultural pride
which could represent itself in the idea of an "Israel redeemer of
humanity," as well as in the -- however limited -- practice of
proselytism.[51] The real purpose of the world is
Israel, and within Israel, the just people. Yechiel therefore rejects the
Aristotelian and Maimonidean idea of the internal purposiveness of every
created thing, and he develops this through a parable. A man owns a field
perfect for planting. He performs all the necessary preparations and plants a
tree. This tree grows, develops and starts bearing fruit. But many of the
fruits rot on the branches; others fall before they have ripened. There
remains one single fruit, which grows and ripens as it should, and it reaches
its final state. Now if it is true that the field was the cause of the tree,
as also the tree of the fruit, the farmer's intention and objective in this
work was to obtain that one perfect fruit; indeed, he knew very well that
most of his crop would be lost. In the same way, God has prepared the world
for the planting of that tree -- mankind -- with the intention of obtaining
in the end one single fruit, the people of Israel with their just men.[52] This particularism is probably not
characteristic of the Jews, as it manifests itself as well in Christian
milieux associated with traditionalism and the almost exclusive reference to
the Scriptures. In his Examen Vanitatis
(1520), for example, Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola affirmed that he
"preferred the old theologians of our faith, who contended that one
should undertake some action against the pagan philosophers (gentium philosophos) and destroy their
teachings, rather than philosophize according to their doctrines (as those
who cultivated such studies in the past centuries)."[53]
These affirmations clearly recast the ethnic character of Jewish
particularism. The equivalence made here -- of a cultural, and not an ethnic,
character -- is therefore between an "us" and the heirs of the
dogmatic tradition (to whatever camp they may belong), on the one hand, and,
on the other, a "them" and the rationalists who place themselves
outside this tradition. It is interesting to note how
Yechiel's contemporary, ‘Ovadiah Sforno (1470-1550), in his important
philosophical work Or ‘ammim (Light
of the peoples, Bologna 1537), [54]
returns to the subject of man as the purpose of the universe, adapting this
Renaissance idea to Aristotelian, and in particular Avverroistic,
coordinates, to which he remains faithful. Sforno contends that, even
admitting that superior entities cannot exist to ensure the perfection of
inferior ones, one still cannot deny that man's rational soul is superior to
the heavens insofar as it is separated. Indeed, the heavens, with their
circular and in itself perfect movement, are the cause of the combinations
among the elements of the corruptible world. It is precisely in this world
that man happens to act in order to accomplish his two goals of getting
closer to God by means of his intellect, and of resembling him, in accordance
with the divine precept. Within this conceptual framework,
the Jews occupy a privileged position, not as the executors of the Torah which God himself has reserved
for them, but because they accepted his covenant and are better disposed than
any other people to recognize his sovereignty and to serve him. Further on we
will see how Sforno believes that the superiority of the Jews is justified
for reasons opposite those of Yechiel: in his mind, in fact, the people of
Israel are the true repositories of a rational tradition.[55] If Yechiel exalts the centrality
of man in the universe (and, among men, of the Jews), nevertheless he is not
ready to grant him absolute freedom. Several years before he wrote the Minchath Kenaoth, a heated debate had
developed on free will, stimulated by the Protestant reform. Yechiel
deliberately and explicitly places himself within this debate, for example
denying any validity to the reformist doctrine of the "servant
will." Even had there not been sufficient philosophical proofs, he
argues, the mere fact that the Torah
presents man with commandments implies that there is a freedom of choice:
free will is therefore an indispensable element in the construction of
beliefs.[56] However, Yechiel expresses one important
reservation: free
will is not absolute, and the help of God is necessary to perfect the
inclination that permits man to develop fear and follow the good. This is one
of the principles of the Torah: if
and when on his part man disposes his heart to good actions and to the mitzwoth, he will receive from God
help and energy which will give him sufficient strength to accomplish them. Most
worthy actions that regard the Torah
and the mizwoth, and the beginning
of fear, depend on man: the help he receives from God is to be considered a
reward.[57]
In its basic structure (man's
action completed by divine intervention), this idea is similar to the
catholic doctrine of justification, as sanctioned a few years later by the
Council of Trento. According to this doctrine, faith in a
"propitiatory" Christ can compensate for the weakening of freedom
after the original sin. Only in this way can man be born again to grace.[58] 5.
Modernity and tradition One can take Yechiel's work to be
utterly attached to a traditionalistic vision, as the expression of a spirit
hostile to philosophy and which, within Judaism, manifested itself in a
contempt of Maimonides and a return to internal sources.[59]
However, we know that renewal -- without loading this term with the value
judgments of any philosophy of history -- can easily appear as a return to
tradition, at least initially. In this case the historian must discover,
within traditional arguments, that accent or the few significant details
which nuance them in new ways. We have seen Yechiel's
reservations in regards to philosophy. Naturally, his position was far from
new. Yehudah ha-Lewy takes it as one of the principles informing the Kuzari: philosophy is conceived as the
ancilla prophetiae, where by
prophecy he mainly means that of Moses, conserved and passed on through the
oral and written tradition.[60]
What characterizes Yechiel's position, within this anti-intellectualistic
vein, is his insistence on the insufficiency of the philosophical method,
which founds all explanations on empirical observation and on the subsequent
search for the causes of the phenomenon. This search from the posterior to
the anterior is deemed inappropriate by Yechiel if one wants to reach truth.
The inductive procedure leads one to determine the cause through its effect,
attested by the senses; but both the starting point and this procedure are
marred by imprecision. Prophetic
knowledge, on the contrary, captures the effect through its cause, that is
the posterior along with the anterior, and this is free from errors or
confusion.[61] His opposition to peripatetic
epistemology is clear, even if there is a tendency to emphasize its empirical
aspect. One should consider, for a comparison, the Aristotelian statement
made by Agostino Nifo, to whose works Yechiel referred readers desirous of
more information: Scire proprissimum est scire propter
quid, and
knowledge is only of two kinds: Quae
sunt per se notae vel per sensum, vel seipsis.[62] The same opposition is expressed
in regards to logic as well, for according to Aristotle this is the
instrument of the sciences, and as such it is external to them. According to
Yechiel, instead, in order to understand the Torah there is no need to refer to external means; the necessary
interpretative rules were revealed and transmitted along with the text. The
Hebraic system of knowledge is configured as unitary and in itself complete.[63] Yechiel's tradition-based
certainties are clearly very different from the torments of a Pomponazzi, for
example, just as their two works also differ in intellectual scope.[64] The
Pisan rabbi certainly would not have been able to reach the skeptical
conclusions of the philosopher from Padova. However, this should not let one
conclude that Yechiel's thought was not somewhat in consonance with the
questions addressed in Christian society. The issues he considers (included
that of the transmigration of the soul, which will be developed at length
after the end of the sixteenth century with the Lurianic qabbalah) were of current interest even within the philosophical
debate[65];
and he faces, just as his Christian contemporaries, a philosophical tradition
and maybe a whole way of thinking that by then had become insufficient.
Yechiel's anti-intellectualistic vis
and Pomponazzi's rigorously rational knowledge ultimately reach the same
conclusions: on fundamental questions, such as the soul's immortality,
thought conducted according to the old rules cannot give convincing answers.
The Pisan's answer is to turn to tradition; the Paduan's more prudent and
perhaps more skeptical solution also seems to tend towards a religious
horizon, in which, however, it is not tradition, but faith, that is
foregrounded.[66] In a certain sense, the extremely
traditionalist Yechiel was more "modern" than figures like Sforno,
teacher of reason, and another prominent Italian Jewish intellectual, Mosheh
Provenzalo (1503-1575). Sforno critiqued blind tradition
harshly, exalting reason as the only means to distinguish truth from
falsehood: The fear and zeal for the Torah (of the pure traditionalist) are
founded on a story passed on from father to child. [...] God never ordered
that one believe in his existence, in his power and in his providence,
because faith does not depend on will, as experience has shown and as the
Philosopher has demonstrated in De
anima II, 153 [...] but He presented true and just ideas along with their
rational argumentation.[67] Finding in Aristotle many
conclusions that contradicted their beliefs, the traditionalists, Sforno
contends, simply denied them, without the support of any proof. The Jews
instead are the heirs of a rational tradition, founded by ‘Ever and continued
by Abraham, and concerned with the existence of God, his attributes and many
other similar questions. Rational Jewish science survived on the ruins of
Chaldean science.[68] As to Mosheh Provenzalo, rabbi in
Mantova and a jurist, grammarian and philosopher of remarkable interest, his
fame is essentially linked to the extremely liberal attitude of his ritual
decisions, which provoked heated debates and caused him numerous difficulties
in the exercise of his functions within the Jewish community. From a
philosophical point of view, however, he is a conservative, or better, a
rationalist-conservative. In his commentary on Maimonides' Axioms, he tries in fact to
reestablish, within the Maimonidean alveolus, that division between
substantial and accidental causality, which had radically called into
question an important moment of Aristotelian metaphysics. The issue at stake
here is infinity in the causal chain, as well as in time and space, which
according to Aristotelian presuppositions was impossible. Chisday Crescas had
attacked these conclusions in depth and with productive results, opening the
road to the idea of an infinite space and an infinity of worlds -- an idea
which is rightly considered to be one of the main foundations of modern
thought. Provenzalo overturns Crescas'
argument. Without going into any detail, we simply recall that, as he follows
Crescas in demolishing the distinctions between accidental causality (whose
possible infinity had already been acknowledged) and essential causality
(whose infinity had been denied), Provenzalo compares accidental causality
with essential causality, instead of the latter with the former, as the
Spanish philosopher had done. This inverted perspective allows him to found
the non-eternity of the world and its having been created, thereby
accomplishing the traditional objective of religious scholars. Thus,
Provenzalo tries to integrate Crescas' explosive criticism within
Aristotelian-Maimonidean thought, using the new to reinforce the old -- a
defensive action which will not be crowned with success.[69] The great edifice of Aristotelism
is therefore about to become the heredity of a superseded past, even for the
Jews. It is interesting to note that the new is constructed through the very negation
of a rational structure whose conceptual precision and internal coherence
were very advanced. The interiorized experience of the Florentine
Neoplatonists,[70]
as also Yechiel's turning to the qabbalah
-- like many others after him -- might respond to similar needs that will
later emerge in the new philosophy of nature and in modern science. But
before Galileo and the establishment of a new rationality, the rebellion
against the old seems to present itself as a reaction against rationalism qua rationalism: modernity emerges, in
a way, from within an anti-intellectualistic field. With his constant reliance on
suggestion, rather than on argumentation, and with his difficult elaboration
of a world vision alternative to Maimonides' -- which had been able to
reconcile revealed religion and rationalism -- Yechiel moves in unison with
the Italian culture of his time. An important author like Gianfrancesco Pico
della Mirandola, nephew of Giovanni, formulates a critique of Aristotelism
exactly in the same terms as the Pisan rabbi: Aristoteli
demonstrandi ars incerta, quia fundatur in indicio iudicioque sensum[71] and he shares his idea of an
authentic prophecy -- which one reaches through a free gift of God --
distinct from the one which originates in evil spirits.[72] While Gianfrancesco bemoaned the
uncertainty and unreliability of philosophy's results, the object of
continuous debates, Yechiel underlines their insufficiency. The practical criterion of the quantity and amplitude
of the answers replaces the theoretical one of demonstrability. Philosophy's
caution represents for him not only a symptom, but also a reason of its
inferiority vis-à-vis traditional doctrines. He voices his opinion on the
matter on many occasions with a surprising candor. The conclusions which
philosophers can reach on the issue of the angels (corresponding to the
intellects), for example, is nothing but a
drop of water in the large sea of truths revealed to the prophets by the
sacred doctors.[73]
And
furthermore: philosophy cannot conceive the attributes of God merely through
a negative definition: God is not corporeal, etc. But Yechiel explicitly
declares that he cannot be content with this: I
would like to know what one finally knows this way, given that negation does
not produce knowledge.[74] Yechiel takes up Crescas' famous
critique of Maimonides. However, while the Spanish philosopher's observations
had an epistemological starting point (the negation of an attribute is equal
to the affirmation of its opposite; therefore God's attributes can be
predicated as analogous to men's, but infinite and original), Yechiel
underlines the entirely practical need of positive contents.[75] The move from rational
argumentation to traditional-cabalist narrative is particularly clear in
regards to prophecy, as already mentioned. Let us follow it in its
development. As a first step, Yechiel critiques
Maimonides' semi-naturalistic framework, which granted much importance to
man's imaginative faculty, as well as to his ability to capture the images
created by God and sent to him by means of the active intellect.[76] The
next step consists in replacing the faculty of imagination with the
intellect: God -- in his great goodness -- causes a knowledge, similar to
that of the primary Cause, to pass from potentiality to actuality in the
prophet's intellect. In this way, every naturalistic aspect of the prophecy
is eliminated, and the accent is definitely shifted onto the will of God and
away from human disposition.[77]
The third step consists in the allusion to esoteric doctrines, which concern
the vision of the merkavah
(Ezechiel's divine chariot) and include the tradition relative to the
"Throne of Glory" and to the "Celestial Man." But rabbis
have explicitly prohibited that one speak of these doctrines, the
"extraordinary secrets." This does not prevent one from speaking of
the divine origin of the prophecy in positive terms. This is the last step of
Yechiel's work, after the traditional distinction between Moses and the other
Jewish prophets.[78]
On the basis of Recanati's commentary on the Torah, Yechiel distinguishes the different sefiroth appointed to the prophecy of Israel and of the other
peoples. In his examination of the maledictions of Bil’am, which transform
themselves in benedictions (Numbers XXII-XXIV, Deuteronomy XXIII, 6), he
arrives at the conclusion that the
nations receive the prophecy from the energy of the attribute of judgment [din], as it had happened until them to Bil'am. Thanks to the great
mercy that he nourishes for his people, God caused the energy of the
attribute of mercy [rachamim] to descend upon them.[79] In this oscillation between
philosophical tradition, esotericism and a need for positive contents, the
research of Yechiel Nissim Da Pisa is well represented. Alessandro Guetta |
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